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The Philosophical Basis of the Method 
of Antilogic
Filozoficzne podstawy antylogiki
Abstrakt: Artykuł poświęcony jest sofistycznej metodzie antylogicznej. Tradycyjne rozu-
mienie antylogiki ujmowanej jako przejaw agonicznych i erystycznych skłonności sofistów 
i pod wpływem optyki Platona przeciwstawianej dialektyce zostało w ostatnich dekadach, 
pod wpływem pracy G.B. Kerferda, zastąpione rozumieniem antylogiki jako samoistnej 
techniki argumentacyjnej, mającej swe własne źródła, istotę i cele. Idąc za interpretacją 
G.B. Kerferda, wedle której fundamentem antylogiki jest opozycja dwu logoi wynikająca 
ze sprzeczności lub przeciwieństwa, w konieczny sposób związanego ze światem zmysło-
wym, w artykule dowodzi się, że filozoficznych podstaw antylogiki należy poszukiwać 
w przedstawieniu poglądów przypisywanych Protagorasowi w Platońskim dialogu Teajtet.
Słowa klucze: sofistyka, Protagoras, antylogika
It is commonly accepted that interest in the logos as an instrument of 
persuasion led to the formation of the three basic sophistic methods of er-
istic, dialectic, and antilogic. The most mysterious, but — as Plato contends 
in the dialogue the Sophist — essentially linked with the sophistic move-
ment is the art of antilogic.1
 1 In ancient texts, this method is called the method of “opposed speeches” (logoian-
tikeimenoi, logoi enantioi), “two-fold arguments” (duo logoi, amfo to logo, dissoi logoi), 
“antilogic” (antilogike), or “enantiology” (enantiologia).
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Traditional interpretation of antilogic
The interpretative tradition treats antilogic as an expression of eristic 
“word juggling,” already exposed by Plato and Aristotle. The scarcity of 
records about this method, the pejorative tone of Plato’s dialogues and 
Aristotle’s criticism, as well as the indignation that this method elicited both 
in the sophists’ contemporaries and in later centuries prompted researchers 
to attribute only rhetorical or eristic significance to the method of antilogic. 
The dismissive attitude towards antilogic continues to this day, and even in-
sightful scholars succumb to it. The basic objection to antilogic is the belief 
that it results from the sophists’ agonistic rhetoric and its only goal is to 
defeat one’s opponent in a debate without any concern for truth.
Due to this odium that has been weighing on it for decades, the subject 
of “contrasting arguments” has not garnered adequate attention in studies in 
the history of philosophy, rhetoric, or logic. Though many researchers have 
emphasized that arguing for opposing theses is one of the methods proper 
to the sophists,2 this has not led to in-depth research on this issue.
The reasons for this state of affairs can be seen in the traditional belief 
that the main sophistic method is rhetoric, understood as the ability to give 
judicial, political or epideictic speeches, and eristic, a method of questions 
and answers aimed at seeking victory in argument by refuting the oppo-
nent’s position regardless of the truth. According to this traditional belief, 
both methods — rhetoric and eristic — are in opposition to Socrates’s 
method of “questions and answers,” that is, dialectic.
From this perspective, antilogic has been equated with eristic or con-
sidered a part of rhetorical education and, as a method aimed solely at 
victory in a dispute, opposed to Plato’s dialectic. An example of this way 
of thinking is F. Ueberweg’s assessment of antilogic; Ueberweg, when 
he mentions the form of Protagoras’s work Antilogikoi (“Contradictory 
arguments”), speaks of “the double-sided pseudodialectic procedure” 
(“das doppelseitige pseudo-dialektische Verfahren”).3 F. Ueberweg uses 
 2 G.W.F. Hegel (G.W.F. Hegel: Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, 
vol. 1. Berlin 1883, p. 23), contrasting “die Sophistik” with “die Sophisterei,” wrote: “Die 
Sophisterei ist so schlimm, in dem Sinne, als ob dies Eigentümlichkeit sei, der sich nur 
schlechte Menschen schuldig machen. Die Sophistik ist so aber viel allgemeiner; es ist al-
les Räsonieren aus Gründen — das Geltendmachen solcher Gesichtspunkte, das Anbringen 
von Gründen und Gegengründen.”
 3 F. Ueberweg: Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie des Alterthums. Berlin 
1876, p. 89.
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the same term “pseudo-dialektisch” to describe the eristic argumentation 
of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus presented in Plato’s Euthydemus (“die 
pseudo-dialektischen Gaukler”).4 F. Ueberweg’s equating of the method 
of opposed speeches and eristic is significant and reflects the generally 
accepted view of the time.
A similar perspective also finds expression in many more recent works. 
Though L. Robin and T. Buchheim5 are aware of the distinctiveness of 
antilogic as a specific sophistic method, they primarily connect it with the 
theme of verbal disputes. L. Robin notes: “Since their (sc. the sophists’) 
object was to prepare the pupil for every conflict in thought or action to 
which social life might give rise, their method was essentially ‘antilogy’ 
or controversy, the opposition of the theses possible with regard to certain 
themes, or ‘hypotheses,’ suitably defined and classified. The pupil had to 
learn to criticize and to argue, to organize a ‘joust’ of reasons against 
reasons.”6 L. Robin rightly indicates the main feature of antilogic, which is 
the ability to argue for both contradictory arguments on any topic. However, 
like many other researchers, in emphasizing its agonistic nature as a basic 
feature of the method of contrasting arguments, he only highlights the po-
lemical aspect of the art of antilogic.
It seems that at the root of the way of thinking represented by the 
above-mentioned researchers lies a belief which developed in antiquity in 
the fourth and fifth centuries B.C. E. Dupréel indicates this, writing: “Dès 
l’antiquité, on a voulu comprendre que Protagoras avait marqué son indif-
férence complete a l’égard du pour et du contre. Nier et affirmer une même 
chose a la même valeur, dès lors chacun a licence de ne s’attacher qu’à 
celle des deux propositions contradictoires q’il juge la plus conforme à ses 
intêrets.”7 Protagoras’s antilogical motto, according to which it is possible 
to argue for and against any thesis, perfectly fit the negative image of the 
sophist as an unscrupulous manipulator. Combined with the “ethical” inter-
pretation of Protagoras’s theorem, “making the weaker argument stronger,”8 
it gave rise to the accusation that the sophists acted solely in their own 
interest. This interpretation of the dissoi logoi method can already be seen 
 4 Ibid., p. 94.
 5 For example, T. Buchheim: Die Sophistik als Avantgarde normalen Lebens. 
Hamburg 1986, p. 12. regards antilogic as a means of achieving victory in verbal disputes.
 6 L. Robin: Greek Thought and the Origins of the Scientific Spirit. New York 1996, 
p. 140.
 7 E. Dupréel: Les Sophistes. Protagoras, Gorgias, Prodicus, Hippias. Neuchâtel 
1948, p. 38.
 8 H. Diels, W. Kranz. Eds.: Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. Griechisch und 
Deutsch von Hermann Diels. Herausgegeben von Walther Kranz, I—III vols. 13th ed. 
Dublin—Zürich 1969. (DK 80 6B).
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in early sources, such as Aristophanes’s Clouds, in which the comedy writer 
combined the method of “contrasting arguments with the conviction that its 
goal is to win in unfair trials.”9 A reference to the method of “contradic-
tory arguments” appears in a similar context in Euripides’s tragedy Antiope, 
in which haplos mythos, contrasted with the sophistic “double speeches,” 
expresses the truth.10
This negative image of antilogic was completed by Plato’s works.11 
Already in his early dialogues, we find the opposition of sophistic meth-
ods and Socratic dialectic, which is expressed by the emphasis Plato puts 
on presenting the sophists’ inefficiency in using the question and answer 
method.12 In the late dialogue the Sophist, devoted to the search for the 
definition of a sophist, Plato shows that the most significant feature of 
a sophist is the connection with antilogic, and the sophist himself is called 
an “antilogician.”13
This contrasting of dialectic and the sophistic methods of eristic and 
antilogic in Plato’s works is noticed by R. Robinson, who writes: “Plato 
constantly has in mind a certain opposite of dialectic, something super-
ficially like dialectic and yet as bad as dialectic is good, something against 
which the would-be dialectician must always be on guard. He has two chief 
names for this shadow or reverse of dialectic, antilogic and eristic. By ‘eris-
tic,’ or the art of quarrelling, he indicates that the aim of this procedure is 
 9 T.J. Morgan: Literate Education in Classical Athens. “The Classical Quarterly New 
Series” 1999, vol. 49 no. 1, p. 52.
 10 On the “two speech” method in pre-Platonic testimonies, cf. Z. Nerczuk: Metoda 
‘dwu mów’ w świetle świadectw przedplatońskich. “Studia Antyczne i Mediewistyczne” 
2012, vol. 45 no. 10, pp. 37—50.
 11 E. Schiappa argues that the term “antilogike techne” was “almost certainly” coined 
by Plato, but “it is reasonable to attribute the origin of antilogike as a practice (if not as 
a term) to Protagoras” (E. Schiappa: Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy 
and Rhetoric. Columbia (South Carolina) 2003, p. 164). We know from sources that the 
term antilogikos had appeared even earlier. The earliest text in which the term appears 
is Aristophanes’s Clouds, in which the term refers to someone whose profession consists 
in presenting the opposite opinion. We can assume that this is an allusion to the title of 
Protagoras’s treatise Antilogiai or Antilogikoi.
 12 Cf. e.g. Pl., Gorg., 466a—467c.
 13 Cf. Pl., Soph., 232b. F.M. Cornford (F.M. Cornford: Plato’s Theory of Knowledge, 
The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato Translated with a Running Commentary. London 
1935, p. 190) interprets this passage thus: “This passage enlarges the meaning of ‘contro-
versy’ so as to include the rhetorical Sophists the hunters of Division I, the ‘producers 
of persuasion’ (pithanourgike) and professors of spurious education in goodness, who 
were alternatively regarded as salesmen of the soul’s nourishment in Divisions II—IV. 
Protagoras himself will presently be named. Because of this wider sense, ‘controversy’ 
is pitched upon as a character common to all the types described in the earlier Divisions 
(except the purifier of the soul) and as the ‘most revealing’ trait.”
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to win the argument, whereas the aim of dialectic is to discover truth. By 
‘antilogic,’ or the art of contradiction, he indicates that it is a tendency to 
contradict, to maintain aggressively whatever position is opposite to that of 
one’s interlocutor […]. The more detailed connotation of ‘eristic’ and ‘anti-
logic’ tends to be whatever Plato happens to think of as bad method at the 
moment, just as ‘dialectic’ is to him at every stage of his thought whatever 
he then considered the best method.”14
According to R. Robinson, in Plato’s works antilogic and eristic are set 
in opposition to the ideal method, which Plato calls “dialectic.” The con-
trast of the sophistic and dialectical methods, so strongly visible in all of 
Plato’s work, is therefore part of Plato’s polemical strategy directed against 
the sophists.
The opinions of F. Ueberweg, L. Robin, and E. Dupréel presented above 
are the result of an interpretative tradition derived from Plato and Aristotle, 
which connected the sophists with rhetoric and eristic, and the true philoso-
phy and dialectic with Socrates and Plato. Under its influence, the sophists 
were associated with the domination of form over content, the prevalence 
of the eristic and ludic element, and the abandonment of any “philosophi-
cal” truth-orientedness. For example, H.-I. Marrou writes in this spirit, 
noting that Protagoras indeed borrowed his polemical tricks and dialectic 
from Zeno: “but at the same time he emptied them of their profound and 
serious content.” As H.-I. Marrou continues, Protagoras “kept only the bare 
skeleton, from which, by a process of systematization, he formulated the 
principles of eristics, a debating-method that was supposed to confound any 
kind of opponent by taking points he had himself conceded and using them 
as a starting-point for further argument.”15
The new perspective in interpretation of antilogic
The recent decades have brought many changes in the reigning inter-
pretative perspective. Many scholars have pondered the source of common 
philosophical terms such as “philosopher,” “sophist,” “rhetor,” “dialectic,” 
 14 R. Robinson: Plato’s Earlier Dialectic. Ithaca—New York 1941, pp. 88—89.
 15 H.-I. Marrou: A History of Education in Antiquity. Trans. G. Lamb. New York 
1964, p. 83.
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and “antilogic.”16 As a result, there was a growing conviction that certain 
semantic and interpretational canons established in tradition are unable to 
withstand closer analysis. Their general understanding is largely determined 
by one perspective, which is that of the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition.17
In this spirit, renewed reflection on the sophistic techniques of argument 
was also undertaken.18 Not only were the sophists’ rhetorical achievements 
recognized, taking into account their philosophical foundation, but so was 
the “element of logical formalism” that lies at the source of sophistic argu-
mentation.19 This more thorough approach to the sophistic movement led to 
the distinction of sophistic methods, to the determination of their character 
and purpose, as well as to a rethinking of Plato’s attitude towards them.
G.B. Kerferd’s reflections in this area were groundbreaking.20 In his syn-
thetic work devoted to the sophistic movement, the researcher examines three 
basic forms of the “art of persuasion” developed by the sophists: dialectic, 
eristic, and antilogic. Their accurate distinction, and above all the indication 
of the essence of antilogic, was recognized by G.B. Kerferd as fundamental 
for understanding “the true nature of the sophistic movement.”21 On the one 
hand, G.B. Kerferd perpetuated a theme that appeared in earlier literature. 
The antilogical method understood as setting up contradictory predicates 
for the same subjects had already been written about, and it was associated 
with Protagoras and his lost works entitled Antilogies or Art of Eristic and 
a fragmentary, anonymous text entitled Dissoi Logoi (“Double speeches”). 
 16 Cf., e.g., E. Schiappa: Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and 
Rhetoric, pp. 39—63.
 17 A. Nehamas: Eristic, Antilogic, Sophistic, Dialectic: Plato’s Demarcation of 
Philosophy from Sophistry. In: Virtues of Authenticity. Essays on Plato and Socrates. 
Princeton 1999, p. 110: “The reason why it is important to remind ourselves of Iocrates’s 
views, crude as they may appear, is that they make it clear that in the fourth century 
B.C. terms like ‘philosophy,’ ‘dialectic,’ and ‘sophistry’ do not seem to have had a widely 
agreed-upon application. On the contrary, different authors seem to have fought with one 
another with the purpose of appropriating the term ‘philosophy,’ each for his own practice 
and educational scheme. In the long run, of course, Plato (followed in this respect, and 
despite their many differences, by Aristotle) emerged victorious. He thereby established 
what philosophy is by contrasting it not only with sophistry but also with rhetoric, poetry, 
traditional religion, and the specialized sciences.”
 18 M. Gagarin: Probability and Persuasion: Plato and Early Greek Rhetoric. In: 
Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action. Ed. I. Worthington. London—New York 1994, 
pp. 46—68.
 19 W. Wieland: Zur Problemgeschichte der formalen Logik. In: Sophistik. Ed. 
C.J. Classen. Darmstadt 1976, p. 249.
 20 G.B. Kerferd: The Sophistic Movement. Cambridge 1981, pp. 59—67.
 21 Ibid., p. 62: “A solution to this question, namely what is the true nature of antilogic, 
is a matter of some importance and indeed of urgency. It is in many ways the key to the 
problem of understanding the true nature of the sophistic movement.”
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On the other hand, however, G.B. Kerferd set new standards. According to 
this researcher, the image of the sophistic movement that associates it une-
quivocally with eristic — understood as the pursuit of victory in arguments 
without any regard for the means used — does not correspond to what can 
be reconstructed on the basis of testimonies, including those of Plato, which 
are not so unambiguously critical as was previously thought. According to 
Kerferd, reducing the discussion between Plato and the sophists to the op-
position of two methods, dialectic and eristic, is a great simplification, one 
of many stereotypes prevailing in the history of philosophy. Their source 
is superficial interpretation of Plato and the resulting conviction that the 
philosopher equates antilogic with eristic. Contrary to the “long tradition 
in Platonic studies of treating the two words as simply interchangeable,”22 
Kerferd argues that Plato’s attitude toward antilogic and eristic differs. 
Eristic is unequivocally criticized by Plato. Etymologically speaking, it is 
“seeking victory in argument,” an art that deals with ways of achieving this 
goal regardless of the truth. Eristic develops resources helpful in achieving 
this goal, such as paralogisms, ambiguities, long monologues, and logical 
fallacies, such as the arguments of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus presented 
by Plato in Euthydemus. As G.B. Kerferd writes: “Consequently as used by 
Plato, the term eristic regularly involves disapproval and condemnation.”23
According to G.B. Kerferd, antilogic and eristic differ in both their 
meaning and in the attitude Plato has towards each of the two methods. 
Kerferd notes that, although Plato does not regard antilogic as a method 
of philosophical debate, but develops his own dialectical method (in con-
trast to antilogic, it refers to an extra-sensual reality and is not limited to 
stating opposites in the sensual sphere),24 his approach to it is positive.25 
According to Plato, antilogic is only a technique, in itself neither good nor 
bad — a method situated between dialectic and eristic. As such, it has its 
place in Plato’s thought. In the early dialogues, it adopts the form of the 
elenchos connected with Socrates, which consists in bringing the interlocu-
tor to a state of aporia resulting from the contradiction of two statements 
he has made.26 As G.B. Kerferd summarizes: “This is clearly an application 
of antilogic.”27
 22 Ibid.
 23 Ibid., p. 63.
 24 Ibid., pp. 67, 103.
 25 Ibid., p. 64. Kerferd emphasizes that Plato sees the danger in the possibility of abuse 
of antilogic, in particular by young people.
 26 R. Robinson: Plato’s Earlier Dialectic, p. 7.
 27 G.B. Kerferd: The Sophistic Movement, p. 66.
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In the light of this interpretation, antilogic is one of three basic so-
phistic methods with its own sources, essence, and goals. As G.B. Kerferd 
argues, the foundation of antilogic is the opposition of two logoi resulting 
from contradictions or opposites necessarily associated with the phenomenal 
world.28 Antilogic, unlike eristic, “constitutes a specific and fairly definite 
technique, namely that of proceeding from a given logos, say the position 
adopted by an opponent, to the establishment of a contrary or contradictory 
logos in such a way that the opponent must either accept both logoi, or at 
least abandon his first position.”29
In this view, antilogic encompasses all forms of leading to contradic-
tory or opposing theses in a discussion, including, as G.B. Kerferd em-
phasizes, the form of elenchos so characteristic of the Platonic Socrates.30 
Kerferd’s description of antilogic is therefore very broad. It includes all 
forms of dispute in which one logos is set in opposition to another or at-
tention is drawn to an opposition of logoi occurring in the discussion or 
in a given state of affairs. According to G.B. Kerferd, all procedures that 
rely on emphasizing opposites, not only in arguments but also in entities or 
facts, are antilogical.31
This emphasis on contradictions in Protagoras’s method has its own spe-
cific quality. According to Kerferd, there is an important difference between 
the occurrences of opposing arguments in the literature, and Protagoras’s 
method of antilogy, which is that in the case of Protagoras, the “opposing 
arguments” are made by one speaker, and not by two different people.32 
This feature of Protagoras’s method was not always noticed by researchers, 
most likely due to its paradoxicality. An example of such a misunderstand-
ing is the interpretation of nineteenth-century scholar F.A. Lange, which is 
worth quoting because it reflects a belief commonly accepted at the time. 
 28 Ibid. “That Plato himself was aware that his view of the phenomenal world involved 
antilogic emerges clearly from a famous passage in the Phaedo (89dl—90c7) […].”
 29 Ibid., p. 63: “It consists in opposing one logos to another logos, or in discovering 
or drawing attention to the presence of such an opposition in an argument or in a thing 
or state of affairs. The essential feature is the opposition of one logos to another either 
by contrariety or contradiction. It follows that, unlike eristic, when used in argument it 
constitutes a specific and fairly definite technique, namely that of proceeding from a given 
logos, say the position adopted by an opponent, to the establishment of a contrary or con-
tradictory logos in such a way that the opponent must either accept both logoi, or at least 
abandon his first position.”
 30 Ibid., pp. 65—66.
 31 Ibid., p. 85. According to Kerferd, antilogic is “the most characteristic feature of 
the thought of the whole Sophistic period.”
 32 Ibid., p. 84. “But the essential feature was not simply the occurrence of oppos-
ing arguments but the fact that both opposing arguments could be expressed by a single 
speaker, as it were within a single complex argument.”
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Summing up Protagoras’s method, this researcher claimed that its charac-
teristic feature is that contradictory judgments are uttered by two different 
individuals. With this interpretation, however, it would be difficult to talk 
about any sort of innovation on the part of Protagoras. It trivializes the 
claim of the sophist from Abdera, reducing it to a simple statement of con-
tradiction occurring among expressed beliefs, i.e. to the judgment that “for 
every statement someone makes, the opposite statement can be made just 
as well, as long as there is someone who accepts it.”33
G.B. Kerferd’s theses had such a big impact that a large portion of the 
mentions of antilogic contained in later studies boils down to a discussion 
of his reflections, possibly to comments or polemics with his theses.34 As 
M. Mendelson aptly put it, the remarks contained in G.B. Kerferd’s work 
on the antilogic have become “the critical standard” of all subsequent re-
flections.35
The philosophical context of the antilogical method
G.B. Kerferd’s work did, however, give the impetus to further research on 
the meaning, source, and significance of antilogic. Although its individual 
theses had already appeared in earlier works,36 its synthetic and transparent 
 33 F.A. Lange: Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der 
Gegenwart. Iserlohn und Leipzig 1887, p. 30: “Nun erklärt sich der zweite Satz mit 
Leichtigkeit ohne Widersinn, sobald man die nähere Bestimmung hinzufügt, wie dies 
das System des Protagoras verlangt: im Sinne von zwei verschiedenen Individuen. Es fiel 
Protagoras nicht ein, die nämliche Behauptung im Munde des nämlichen Individuums für 
wahr und falsch zugleich zu erklären; wohl aber lehrt er, dass zu jedem Satz, den jemand 
behauptet, mit gleichem Recht das Gegenteil behauptet werden kann, insofern sich jemand 
findet, dem es so scheint.”
 34 A. Nehamas: Eristic, Antilogic, Sophistic, Dialectic: Plato’s Demarcation of 
Philosophy from Sophistry, pp. 111—115; M. Mendelson: Many Sides: A Protagorean 
Approach to the Theory, Practice and Pedagogy of Argument. Dordrecht—Boston—
London 2002.
 35 M. Mendelson: Many Sides: A Protagorean Approach to the Theory, Practice and 
Pedagogy of Argument, p. 45.
 36 Cf., for example, G.A. Kennedy: The Art of Persuasion in Greece. Princeton 1963, 
p. 33: “As we have seen, to many sophists such a confrontation of opposites is the fun-
damental process of reasoning, and it seems safe to conclude that some of the popularity 
of antithesis in the fifth century was its compatibility to contemporary logic. Perhaps one 
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form helped it draw attention to the problem itself and delineated a certain 
understanding of the antilogical method, later repeated many times in nu-
merous works. It also inspired reflections on sophistic methods (often criti-
cal of Kerferd’s theses) undertaken in the contributions of A. Nehamas,37 
Mi-Kyoung Lee,38 E. Schiappa,39 M. Mendelson,40 F.D. Walters,41 and many 
others, which confirmed the fundamental importance of the antilogical 
method for the sophistic movement and its relationship with the thought of 
Protagoras and Gorgias. It also drew attention to the problem of the philo-
sophical context of the antilogical method, of which, in the light of previous 
research, it had been completely deprived. The rehabilitation of the sophists 
that took place over the last century has brought only partial changes in 
this respect. Although the importance of the sophists in Greek culture was 
recognized and their philosophical achievements acknowledged, a problem-
atic conviction remained dominant, which proclaimed the separation of the 
philosophical and rhetorical spheres of interest of the sophists; this convic-
tion resulted partly from tradition, partly from the loss of the sources. Even 
researchers who are aware of the philosophical importance of sophistry 
have only infrequently perceived the relationship between the philosophical 
convictions and the rhetorical activity of the sophists. Hence, most texts 
written before G.B. Kerferd’s book discuss the particular elements of indi-
vidual sophists’ thought, without attempting to develop those elements that 
could connect these areas and which could indicate that the notion of logos 
and above all the method of contradictory arguments arise from a certain 
view of reality and human cognition.
should go further and regard stylistic antithesis as the source of sophistic logic in the same 
way that judicial procedure may be the source of sophistic epistemology.”
 37 A. Nehamas: Eristic, Antilogic, Sophistic, Dialectic: Plato’s Demarcation of 
Philosophy from Sophistry, pp. 108—122.
 38 M. Lee: Epistemology after Protagoras: Responses to Relativism in Plato, Aristotle, 
and Democritus. Oxford 2005.
 39 E. Schiappa: Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric, 
pp. 39—63.
 40 M. Mendelson: Many Sides: A Protagorean Approach to the Theory, Practice and 
Pedagogy of Argument, passim.
 41 F.D. Walters: Gorgias as Philosopher of Being: Epistemic Foundationalism in 
Sophistic Thought. “Philosophy and Rhetoric,” 1994, vol. 27, no. 2, p. 145. As F.D. Walters 
writes, antilogic is a “theory of argumentation that stands in opposition to dialectics, either 
Platonic or Aristotelian […] a method with its own recognizable philosophical imperatives, 
a method that resists the totalizing aims of dialectics but is not itself a formless and aim-
less verbal exercise.”
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This state of affairs has changed in recent decades. The aforementioned 
works of G.B. Kerferd, E. Schiappa, M. Mendelson, and M. Emsbach42 re-
flect not only on the essence, but on the source and meaning of the art of 
antilogic in relation to the other elements of Protagoras’s thought, namely 
ontology and epistemology.43 Each of these studies draws attention to the 
views attributed to Protagoras in Plato’s Theaetetus and points to the conse-
quences for antilogic that flow from the project presented in it.44 Although 
the message contained in Theaetetus certainly cannot completely fill the 
gap caused by the disappearance of almost the entire sophistic legacy, it 
still gives us at least some clues regarding the philosophical foundations of 
the notion of conflicting logoi. It seems to us that this controversial method, 
causing scandal and condemnation in tradition, has a deeper justification, 
an epistemological or ontological foundation, which researchers have not no-
ticed for various reasons. Admittedly, many researchers pointed to the logi-
cal whole consisting of a unity of the sophistic techniques of argument, the 
view of the world in change and the theory of cognition. But the prevailing 
opinions were that there was no such foundation, because the sophists were 
not capable of building philosophical systems.45
It is worth subjecting this thesis to verification. In my opinion, the anti-
logical method is not an eristic trick or a rhetorical exercise. It has its own 
deep meaning, and at its root lie the fundamental — for sophistry — epis-
temological and ontological convictions described in Theaetetus, which are 
then repeated by Aristotle in his Metaphysics, where he criticizes opponents 
of the principle of contradiction.46
 42 M. Emsbach: Sophistik als Aufklärung: Untersuchungen zu Wissenschaftsbegriff 
und Geschichtsauffassung bei Protagoras. Würzburg 1980.
 43 Z. Nerczuk: Der Mensch als Mass aller Dinge. In: Philosophische Anthropologie 
in der Antike. Eds. L. Jansen, Ch. Jedan. Frankfurt—Paris—Lancaster—New Brunswick 
2010, pp. 69—98.
 44 Cf. Also Z. Nerczuk: Miarą jest każdy z nas. Projekt zwolenników zmienności 
rzeczy w platońskim Teajtecie na tle myśli sofistycznej. Toruń 2009.
 45 G. Striker: Methods of Sophistry. In: Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and 
Ethics. Cambridge 1996; G. Reale: Historia filozofii starożytnej. In: Od początków do 
Sokratesa, vol. 1. Lublin 1993.
 46 Z. Nerczuk: Koncepcja „zwolenników zmienności” w Platońskim Teajtecie i jej 
recepcja w myśli greckiej. “Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Myśli Społecznej” 2016, vol. 61, 
pp. 29—40; Z. Nerczuk: References to Plato’s “Theaetetus” in Book G (IV) of Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics. In: Thinking Critically: What Does it Mean? The Tradition of Philosophical 
Criticism and Its Forms in the European History of Ideas. Ed. D. Kubok. Berlin—
Munich—Boston 2017, pp. 65—72.
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The significance of Plato’s account 
in Theaetetus for the foundations of antilogic
Particularly important for the interpretation of antilogic, about which 
— despite its importance for the sophists — very few records have sur-
vived, is Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus. This text, which outlines the founda-
tions of a certain view of reality and of cognition, whose components are 
taken from sophistic thought, simultaneously, though indirectly, shows the 
foundations of the antilogical method, its source and meaning. The theses 
of “adherents of flux,” such as: the adoption of the idea of the subjectiv-
ity of perceptions, resulting from the mechanism of perception (so called 
metaxy theory); rejection of the concepts of truth and falsehood; attempts 
at determining the relationship between language and reality47; and grant-
ing speech a new, independent role, also lead to a new form of world de-
scription with which the antilogical method is associated.48 In this way, the 
so-called “secret doctrine” in the dialogue Theaetetus presents more than 
a series of dispersed ideas merged in one theory by Plato (as some research-
ers maintain), but a coherent project based on the concept of reality in flux 
and some fundamental epistemological theses, which consequently lead to 
a new logic and a new theory of language.
Not seeing or disregarding this overall project is a problem that affects 
most studies on the sophistic movement. Individual elements of sophistic 
thinking are isolated in these studies: the homo-mensura thesis is detached 
from the concept of “being in motion” and the mechanism of perception, 
and the entire doctrine of the power of logos, which includes the art of 
antilogic or the famous motto “make the weaker argument stronger,” is 
detached from its epistemic and ontological roots.
A hidden source of this form of interpretation is the conviction we have 
already mentioned, expressed among others by G. Reale; according to this 
conviction, the sophists were not able to create any comprehensive philo-
sophical system, and “philosophy” reaches maturity only with Plato.49 In my 
opinion, it is a perspective that too simplistically captures the development 
 47 F.D. Walters: Gorgias as Philosopher of Being: Epistemic Foundationalism in 
Sophistic Thought, p. 152: “The dissociation of logos and things naturally encourages 
antilogic.”
 48 Ibid., p. 146: “To know singularity and not dichotomies is, from the antilogic posi-
tion, to know nothing by claiming to know all.”
 49 G. Reale: Historia filozofii starożytnej. In: Od początków do Sokratesa, pp. 294—
296.
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of philosophy from Thales to Plato and Aristotle; it is a perspective that 
was created by these two philosophers and, because of the great influence 
of their thought, survived unchanged for centuries.
Arguments for understanding antilogic as a method arising from 
a broadly understood philosophical project are provided by a whole series 
of doxographic records, beginning with the earliest mentions of antilogic 
contained in Aristophanes’s comedy Clouds and Euripides’s tragedies,50 
through the testimony of Plato and fragments of Books IV and XI of 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics,51 to testimonies from Late Antiquity concerning 
the method of “double speeches” (Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius). All 
these testimonies attribute to Protagoras a universal postulate to predicate 
contradictions for the same subjects.
Direction of future studies
Summing up the above reflections, it can be stated that although the use 
of contradiction was a popular procedure in the Greek literature of the fourth 
and fifth centuries B.C.,52 it is only among representatives of the so-called 
sophistic movement that the antilogical method, i.e. the method of arguing 
for contradictory claims, becomes an expression of the philosophical stance. 
The importance of the method of contrasting arguments lies in the fact that 
it is not merely a superficial procedure or a rhetorical trick, but a practical 
application of philosophical solutions fundamental for the sophistic move-
ment, something comparable in its dimension to what dialectic was to Plato.53
Understanding the meaning and purpose of antilogic is therefore con-
ditioned on reconstructing its philosophical foundations. The weakness of 
 50 Z. Nerczuk: Metoda ‘dwu mów’ w świetle świadectw przedplatońskich, pp. 37—
45.
 51 Z. Nerczuk: Koncepcja „zwolenników zmienności” w Platońskim Teajtecie i jej 
recepcja w myśli greckiej, pp. 32—33.
 52 G.A. Kennedy: The Art of Persuasion in Greece, p. 34: “The habit of antithesis 
was deeply ingrained in the Greek character, as is evident from the men… de construction, 
from the fondness of the Greeks for contrasting figures like Prometheus and Epimetheus, 
and from the structure of most Greek art and literature.”
 53 G. Gogos: Aspekte einer Logik des Widerspruchs. Studien zur griechischen 
Sophistik und ihrer Aktualität. Tübingen 1998, p. 21. According to G. Gogos, antilogic is 
a form of logic formed before the “proper” logic initiated by Plato and Aristotle.
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many interpretations lies precisely in failure to take this context into account. 
G.B. Kerferd’s studies need to be developed, and in themselves constitute 
more of an inspiration for further discussion than a culmination of research. 
What was outlined in Kerferd’s work needs to be supplemented, and often 
corrected. Future studies of antilogic should focus on reconstructing the 
philosophical background expressed by the sophistic art of persuasion and, 
in particular, antilogic. They should also more precisely reconstruct the very 
complex game Plato plays with his readers, a reconstruction very difficult 
to conduct due to the loss of most of the sophistic works that constitute the 
natural context for Plato’s discussions. Only such a research program will 
allow for an in-depth reconstruction of both Plato’s and Aristotle’s thought, 
who know about the method of “two-fold arguments” and are trying to go 
beyond it. Such a program would also allow us to track the transmission 
of this method, which undoubtedly affected Pyrrho, the skeptical Academy, 
and — transformed into the doctrine of the equal strength of opposite judg-
ments (isostheneia) — was revived in its new form in the skepticism of 
Aenesidemus and Sextus Empiricus.
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